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XI. Who is to Give Effects 




International law in the Hungarian domestic legal system can reach its objec-
tives only if it is properly implemented. Such ‘proper implementation’ requires that 
two conditions are met. First, the legislator must effectively introduce internation-
al norms into the domestic legal order. In other words, international instruments 
must be more than isolated, marginalised legal texts without any effective con-
nection to domestic norms. The necessary legal environment needs to be created 
for the effective enforcement of international legal norms: the existing domestic 
law should be modified to be in harmony with the newly undertaken obligations, 
and if it is necessary, new domestic legal regulations need to be issued for the exe-
cution of these obligations. One should expect that international law is given a pri-
ority over conflicting domestic laws and  serves as guidance for the  subsequent 
domestic legislation. Second, the law enforcement organs of a State should have 
a good knowledge of international legal obligations and apply them in the absence 
of the respective national rules.
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The application of  law and  its enforcement mainly belongs to organs of  the 
executive and the judiciary. In a vast majority of cases the application of interna-
tional law takes place at the administrative level as public authorities are primarily 
responsible for implementation of state duties. Many cases before courts have also 
administrative background which means that decisions of administrative organs 
are often reviewed judicially. If one wishes to examine the enforcement of inter-
national legal norms, the research needs to start at the level of administrative or-
gans.1 The 2005 XC Act introduced the obligation for courts to make available only 
anonymised versions of all judgments and orders issued in the period starting on 
1 July 2007 via an internet database,2 so court decisions from that time and on-
wards can be easily accessed and examined.3 The Act did not cover administrative 
decisions; therefore the content of an administrative decision can only be derived 
in  the course of  the judicial review procedure from relevant judicial decisions. 
Therefore, due to the lack of access to administrative decisions, general statements 
concerning application of international norms of administrative authorities can-
not be made.
In fact, from the  point of  view of  applicability of  decisions of  the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) one case, in particular, may draw a very vivid 
picture.4 The case law born following Attila Vajnai’s totalitarian symbol affair re-
vealed many legal aspects of the application of ECtHR judgements by public ad-
ministrative authorities. The paper aims to present and examine the background 
and  the aftermath of  the ECtHR judgement against Hungary (Vajnai v  Hunga-
ry) with a  special regard to the  effective implementation of  its argumentations 
and statements. Notably, it focuses on the legal consequences of an ECtHR judge-
ment for the lowest level of law enforcement: the public administrative authorities 
(the police) who are in charge of enforcement of law in general against those who 
have allegedly breached it. But, in fact, who it is that breaches the law? The paper 
aims to reveal the answer to this question. 
1 The Fundamental Law of Hungary, 25 April 2011 (FL). Art. XXVI (7) reads: “Everyone shall have 
the right to seek legal remedy against decisions of the courts, public administration or other 
authorities which infringe their rights or legitimate interests.” The Fundamental Law of Hun-
gary replaced the former Constitution of 1949 from 1 January 2012.
2 Act XC on freedom of electronic information 2005, Art. 3(1). This act is not in force anymore; 
its provisions were incorporated to Act CXII on informational self-determination and freedom 
of information 2011. 
3 See: Bírósági Határozatok Gyűjteménye (Collection of  Judicial Decisions), <http://www.
birosag.hu/ugyfelkapcsolati-portal/anonim-hatarozatok-tara> (access: 11 March 2016). 
The website has no English version.
4 In Hungary, the ECHR entered into force on 5 November 1992. See: Status of the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, <http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG> (access: 19 November 2014).
X. Who is to Give Effects to the ECtHR Decisions? 483
2. The Background of the Vajnai Saga
On 21 February 2003 Attila Vajnai, the  Vice-President of  the Workers’ Par-
ty, a registered left-wing political party, held a speech at a lawful demonstration. 
It took place in Budapest at the former location of a statue of Karl Marx, which 
had been removed by the authorities. Vajnai wore a five-pointed red star (‘the red 
star’) on his jacket as a symbol of the international workers’ movement. A police-
man, evoking Article 269/B (1)5 of the Criminal Code in force at the time, called 
on Vajnai to remove the star, which the latter denied. His identity was examined, 
his clothes were searched and he was taken to a police station. Subsequently, crim-
inal proceedings were instigated against him for having worn a totalitarian symbol 
in public.6
On 11 March 2004, the Pest Central District Court7 convicted Vajnai for the of-
fence of  using a  totalitarian symbol. It  refrained from imposing a  sanction for 
a probationary period of one year. Vajnai appealed to the Budapest Metropolitan 
Court stating that the restriction on the usage of red star as a symbol of workers vi-
olates freedom of expression. In his view, drawing an equality sign between the red 
star as a symbol of totalitarian regimes and that of the workers and the establish-
ment of a total ban on its use is discriminative. As the principle of non-discrim-
ination is also a basic value of the EU (at that time, the European Community), 
the Vajnai case was among the  first Hungarian cases, which were submitted to 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the basis of fundamental 
5 Act IV Criminal Code 1998, Art. 269/B reads: “The use of totalitarian symbols (1) A person who 
(a) disseminates, (b) uses in public or (c) exhibits a swastika, an SS-badge, an arrow-cross, 
a symbol of the sickle and hammer or a red star, or a symbol depicting any of them, commits 
a misdemeanour – unless a more serious crime is committed – and shall be sentenced to 
a criminal fine. (2) The conduct proscribed under paragraph (1) is not punishable, if it is done 
for the purposes of education, science, art or in order to provide information about history or 
contemporary events. (3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply to the insignia of States which 
are in force.”
6 Unfortunately, the Court’s decisions of that time are not available to the public, therefore, 
the legal statements are to be inferred from the judgment: Vajnai v Hungary, App. no. 33629/06 
(ECHR, 8 July 2008). 
7 Levels of the Hungarian judicial system before the entry into force of the Fundamental FL 
(1 January 2012): 1) local courts together with administrative and labour courts; 2) county 
courts (19) and Budapest Metropolitan Court (it is also a court of first instance for the terri-
tory of the capital); 3) Appellate courts (4) and Budapest-Capital Appellate Court; 4) The Su-
preme Court. After the entry into force of the FL the names of the levels changed: 1) district 
courts together with administrative and labour courts (117); 2) tribunals (19) and Metropoli-
tan Tribunal of Budapest; 3) the Appellate Courts (4) and Budapest-Capital Appellate Court; 
4) The Curia.
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rights infringement.8 On 6 October 2005 the CJEU declared that it had no juris-
diction to answer the question referred by the Budapest Metropolitan Court as 
the  national provisions fell outside the  scope of  Community law and  “the sub-
ject-matter of the dispute is not connected in any way with any of the situations 
contemplated by the Founding Treaties”9 Notably, the CJEU denied that there ex-
ists the relationship between the situation at stake with EU law, and so excluded 
the case from its jurisdiction. During the time of the proceedings before the CJEU, 
the  domestic procedure was suspended. As the  CJEU shortly delivered its de-
cision, the  domestic Court could continue without any useful indications from 
the European forum. Therefore, on 16 November 2005 the Budapest Metropolitan 
Court upheld the conviction. Vajnai alleged that the Hungarian judicial response 
to his humble act of wearing the red star was too much and constituted an unjus-
tified interference with his right to freedom of expression, in breach of Article 10 
ECHR.10 Therefore, he initiated proceedings against Hungary before the ECtHR. 
The  ECtHR was to give the  final ruling on the  following matters: (1) whether 
a  restriction embodied in Hungarian criminal law is  reconcilable with freedom 
of  expression as protected by Article 10 ECHR; (2) whether the  domestic legal 
interference was relevant and sufficient to protect higher principles than the one 
8 In  its order for reference the  Budapest Metropolitan Court observed that in  several Mem-
ber States the symbol of left-wing parties is the red star or the hammer and sickle, whereas 
the  Hungarian Criminal Code prohibits the  use of  those symbols. Therefore, the  question 
arises whether a  provision in  one Member State prohibiting the  use of  symbols of  the in-
ternational labour movement on pain of  criminal prosecution is  discriminatory, whereas 
the display of those symbols on the territory of another Member State does not give rise to 
any sanction. The Budapest Metropolitan Court referred the following preliminary question 
to the CJEU: “Is Article 269/B, first paragraph, of the Hungarian Criminal Code, which pro-
vides that a person who uses or displays in public the symbol consisting of a five-point red 
star commits a minor offence, compatible with the fundamental Community law principle 
of non-discrimination?”, case 328/04 Criminal proceedings against Attila Vajnai (CJEU, 6 Oc-
tober 2015), paras 7–8.
9 Ibidem, paras 12–14.
10 The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (The Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, the ECHR) Art. 10 reads: 
“Freedom of expression
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring 
the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The  exercise of  these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and  responsibilities, may 
be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, terri-
torial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection 
of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for prevent-
ing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority 
and impartiality of the judiciary.”
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expressed by Article 10(1) and (3) whether the measure taken were proportionate 
to the legitimate aims pursued.11
In line with its standing case law, the ECtHR held that the Hungarian regu-
lation in force was not proportionate to the aim of protecting the interests of the 
society to which the  red star symbolized the  terror of  the communist regime.12 
The symbol was not a real and present danger that needed to be interrupted by in-
terference in the freedom of expression of an individual.13 Therefore, the relevant 
regulation of the Criminal Code violated Article 10 ECHR.
11 Vajnai v Hungary (n. 7), para. 45.
12 The Government of Hungary argued that “in 1945 Hungary and other countries of the for-
mer Eastern bloc had been liberated from Nazi rule by Soviet soldiers wearing the red star. 
For many people in these countries, the red star was associated with the idea of anti-fas-
cism and freedom from right-wing totalitarianism. It is before the transition to democracy 
in Central and Eastern Europe, serious crimes had been committed by the security forc-
es of totalitarian regimes, whose official symbols included the red star.” Vajnai v Hungary 
(n. 7), paras 36–37. The government even invoked the decision of the Hungarian Constitu-
tional Court on the same subject, which had been delivered several years before the case 
in question. It fortified the government’s argumentation, as it justified the legality of the 
ban on the use of the red star by the same historical background of the State. See: cases 
14/2000 (V. 12.) ABH (Constitutional Court, decision, 2000) 92–101, available in English at 
<http://www.alkotmanybirosag.hu/letoltesek/en_0014_2000.pdf> (access: 9 July 2014). 
According to the reasoning of the ECtHR “two decades have elapsed from Hungary’s transi-
tion to pluralism and the country has proved to be a stable democracy. […] Moreover, there 
is no evidence to suggest that there is a real and present danger of any political movement 
or party restoring the Communist dictatorship. The Government have not shown the exist-
ence of such a threat prior to the enactment of the ban in question.” Vajnai v Hungary (n. 7), 
para. 49.
13 Cf. The case concerning the Árpád-striped flag, a fascist symbol in Hungary. On 9 May 2007 
the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) held a demonstration in Budapest to protest against 
racism and  hatred. Simultaneously, members of  Jobbik, a  legally registered right-wing 
political party assembled in  an adjacent area to express their disagreement. Fáber was 
silently holding a so-called Árpád-striped flag in the company of some other people, was 
observed by police as he stood nearby, at the steps leading to the Danube embankment 
(the location where in 1944/45, during the Arrow Cross regime, Jews were exterminated 
in large numbers). His position was close to the MSZP event and a few metres away from 
the  lawn of  the square where the  Jobbik demonstration was being held. The  police su-
pervising the scene called on Fáber either to remove the banner or leave. He refused to 
do so, pointing out that this flag was a historical symbol and that no law forbade its display. 
Subsequently he was committed to the Budapest Gyorskocsi Police Holding Facility, where 
he was held in custody and under interrogation for six hours. After he had been released, 
the Budapest 5th District Police Department fined him the regulatory offence of disobeying 
police instructions. After unsuccesful judicial appeals the case was submitted to the ECtHR 
which condamned Hungary again arguing the same as several years ago in the Vajnai case. 
Fáber v Hungary, App. no. 40721/08 (ECHR, 24 July 2012), para. 5 and paras 54–57. On com-
parative analyses of “where memory and law intersect” see: A. Fijalkowski, ‘The criminali-
sation of symbols of the past: Expression, law and memory’ (2014) 10 International Journal 
of Law in Context 3 295.
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One would think that the story ended with the necessary modification of the 
Hungarian criminal law, but it took another turn. Before going into depth in the 
analysis of the case, it is important to see how the relationship between interna-
tional and domestic law in Hungary is regulated.
3. A Brief Introduction to the Status 
of International Legal Sources 
in the Hungarian Legal System
Since 2012, Hungary has had a new constitution called the Fundamental Law 
(FL). The  content of  rules regulating the  relationship between international 
law and the domestic law correspond to the respective rules of the former Consti-
tution (Act XX of 1949 on the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary as revised 
in 1989–90, in force until 31 December 2011 – ‘the Constitution’).14 For this reason 
the present analysis will evoke the provisions of the two constitutive documents 
for the Hungarian State. 
In line with Article 7(1) of the Constitution (currently Article Q15 FL), which 
provides for the  relationship between domestic law and  international law, 
14 N. Chronowski, E. Csatlós, ‘Judicial Dialogue or National Monologue? The  International 
Law and Hungarian Courts’ (2013) 1 ELTE Law Journal 7. On the relation of international law 
and Hungarian law (before FL), see: N. Chronowski, T. Drinóczi, I. Ernszt, ‘Hungary’, [in:] Shel-
ton D. (ed.), International Law and Domestic Legal Systems – Incorporation, Transformation, 
and Persuasion (OUP 2011) 261.
15 Art. Q FL reads:
“(1) In order to create and maintain peace and security, and to achieve the sustainable devel-
opment of humanity, Hungary shall strive for cooperation with all the peoples and coun-
tries of the world.
(2) In  order to comply with its obligations under international law, Hungary shall ensure 
that Hungarian law be in conformity with international law.
(3) Hungary shall accept the generally recognised rules of international law. Other sources 
of international law shall become part of the Hungarian legal system by promulgation 
in legal regulations.”
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the Constitutional Court16 found that international norms in the Hungarian legal 
system can be classified into three categories:17
(1) The  ‘generally recognised rules of  international law’, that is  the customary 
international law, jus cogens and general principles of law recognised by civ-
ilised nations,18 have at least constitutional rank in the Hungarian hierarchy 
of legal norms, because they can be regarded as a part of the Constitution, 
they formulate the part of it. Moreover, jus cogens norms have even a priority 
over it. Following the monistic approach, no further act is necessary to give 
these norms effects in domestic legal system.19 
(2) As regards the so-called ‘other sources’ the FL does not declare their priority 
over the domestic law and requires their transformation evoking the dualistic 
doctrine into domestic legal norms. International norms must be transposed 
with the use of Hungarian legislative acts.20 This rule is applicable to treaties, 
mandatory decisions of international organs and certain judgements of inter-
national courts. 
16 The Constitutional Court is the principal organ for the protection of the Fundamental Law 
in Hungary; it is an independent organ. Although, according to the name it is a court, it is not 
a part of the judicial system. The Court has an important role in protecting democratic State 
governed by the  rule of  law, constitutional order and  the rights guaranteed in  the Funda-
mental Law and in safeguarding the inner coherence of the legal system. It has the monopoly 
of interpretation of fundamental law and to determine upon the coherence of legal norms 
in the legal system, notably, it has the right to declare the non-conformity of international ob-
ligations with domestic legal norms and it calls the legislator on the necessary modification 
of domestic norms. On the other hand, the Curia which is the highest instance court in the 
judicial system can also render uniformity decisions in cases of theoretical importance in or-
der to ensure the uniform application of law within the Hungarian judiciary. Such decisions 
are binding on all Hungarian lower instance courts. The difference between the two courts 
is that while the Constitutional Court is responsible for the unity of legal system, it interprets 
legal norms in the view of the Fundamental law, and it has the monopoly of invalidation of le-
gal norms that are not in conformity with the FL, the Curia helps legal practice by interpreting 
legal norms in context with each other by highlighting important judicial decisions that con-
tain significant declarations (Author’s comment).
17 It has to be noted that in the Hungarian legal system EU law is not treated as international 
law sensu stricto. It is a sui generis legal system regulated as such in the FL. See FL (n. 2) Art. E 
[it  was Art.  2/A  in the  Constitution], Case 143/2010 (VII. 14.) (Constitutional Court, 14 July 
2010), available in  English: <http://www.alkotmanybirosag.hu/letoltesek/en_0143_2010.
pdf> (access: 9 July 2014).
18 The category of ‘generally recognised rules of international law’ is explained and explored by 
the practice of the Constitutional Court. Case 53/1993 (X. 13.) (Constitutional Court, 13 Octo-
ber 1993), only the summary is available in English: <http://www.codices.coe.int/NXT/gate-
way.dll/CODICES/precis/eng/eur/hun/hun-1993-3-015?fn=document-frameset.htm$f=tem-
plates$3.0> (access: 9 July 2014) and case 30/1998 (VI. 25.) (Constitutional Court, 25 June 1998), 
available in English: <http://www.alkotmanybirosag.hu/letoltesek/en_0030_1998.pdf> 
(access: 9 July 2014).
19 T. Molnár, A nemzetközi jogi eredetű normák beépülése a magyar jogrendszerbe (Dialóg Cam-
pus, Budapest-Pécs 2013) 65.
20 Act L on the procedure related to international agreements 2005, Art. 9(1).
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Decisions of the ECtHR are not considered as direct sources of international 
law. Instead, they are treated as acts interpreting the law. However, it is not always 
the case. The  judgments of  the ECtHR are granted a different treatment when 
the State was a party to the dispute in which a judgment was delivered. In 2003 
the  Constitutional Court declared that the  decision of  the International Court 
of Justice given in a dispute between Hungary and Slovakia (Gabcikovo–Nagyma-
ros case)21 can be treated neither as a norm of international law nor a treaty but it 
definitely obliges Hungary, as it is a sui generis category of international obliga-
tions under the current status of domestic law. In 2005, however, the new act on 
the procedure regarding treaties was adopted stating clearly that the international 
courts’ decisions in cases the Hungary is a party to are binding and shall be ex-
ecuted in Hungary. In such cases the decision of the international court shall be 
promulgated in the Official Gazette.22 This rule does not apply, however, to de-
cisions in  the proceedings involving individuals, like before the ECtHR.23 Such 
decisions, instead, have to be taken into account in the course of interpretation 
of  the treaty they are based on.24 The ECtHR’s decisions are not binding. Ulti-
mately, they are only indirect sources of law, and can provide a significant guid-
ance for the  interpretation of  the treaty-based obligations.25 The Constitutional 
Court had put this approach forward already a year earlier when it had stated 
in the decision No. 18/2004 (V. 25.) that the jurisprudence of the ECtHR shapes 
the  Hungarian legal practice and  the Hungarian courts and  other state organs 
are obliged to interpret the ECHR in line with the case law of the ECtHR.26 Under 
such circumstances, effective implementation and  enforcement of  judgements 
involve a plurality of actors such as the government, the legislator, the judiciary, 
and local authorities.27
(3) The third category of international norms in the Hungarian legal system is in-
ternational soft law (e.g. recommendations, declarations, final acts), which 
is not mentioned by the FL or other acts. These norms are not considered 
to be legal provisions but moral ones that are complementing the obligation 
of cooperation with the community of nations. The obligation itself is  en-
shrined in the Constitution.28 
21 Gabcikovo–Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) (1997) ICJ Rep 7.
22 Act on the procedure related to international agreements L 2005, Art. 13.
23 T. Molnár (n. 20), p. 184.
24 L Act on the procedure related to international agreements 2005, Art. 13(1).
25 See: case 24.K.35.639/2006/25 (Budapest Metropolitan Court, 7 April 2009), [in:] 
N. Chronowski, E. Csatlós (n. 15) 27.
26 L. Blutman, ‘A nemzetközi jog használata az Alkotmány értelmezésénél’ (2009) 64 Jogtudo-
mányi Közlöny 7-8 301. 
27 H. Keller, C. Marti, ‘Reconceptualizing Implementation: The Judicialization of the Execution 
of the European Court of Human Rights’ Judgments’ (2015) 26 EJIL 4 829.
28 FL (n. 2), Art. Q(1). E. Csatlós, ‘Alkotmánybírósági határozatok: a nemzetközi jog mint értelme-
zési tampon’, [in:] L. Blutman (ed.), A nemzetközi jog hatása a magyar joggyakorlatra (HVG-
ORAC 2014) 442 and E. Csatlós, ‘A Kúria (Legfelsőbb Bíróság) gyakorlata és a nemzetközi jog’, 
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4. The History Repeats Itself: the Administrative 
Authority versus Application of International Law
4.1. The Facts
Eight years after his initial conviction in the original Vajnai dispute, on 21 De-
cember 2008, Vajnai participated in a demonstration, held a speech again and handed 
out flyers decorated by five pointed red stars. The flyers were clearly directed against 
the capitalism when the Police intervened again, for the same reason as years before. 
The incident occurred six months after the proclamation of the ECtHR’s judgment 
on Vajnai v Hungary. Vajnai was accused again of the offence of using a prohibited 
symbol of totalitarianism. The same police procedure was carried out again.29
Vajnai submitted a  complaint to the  Independent Police Complaints Board 
(IPCB) against the police action arguing that the police violated his fundamen-
tal rights and in particular his freedom of expression. The IPCB is an independ-
ent body; it can proceed and investigate certain police measures or acts, examine 
them in a fundamental right protective perspective and decide on whether the rule 
of law was breached.30 Upon the examination of Vajnai’s complaint, the IPCB de-
clared the consistency of the police action with the fundamental rights.31
Vajnai appealed for the judicial review of this administrative decision arguing 
that the police action based on the Criminal Code violated his fundamental rights 
as it ignored the statements of the ECtHR’s Vajnai v Hungary judgment. Contrary 
to the strict provisions of the Criminal Code, the ECtHR judgment definitely de-
clared that the Hungarian regulation on total ban on the usage of red star is exces-
sive and violates the freedom of expression. 
The court of  first instance held that the  police action was consistent with 
the  law as the  policemen acting on site had a  reasonable suspicion to consider 
Vajnai’s behaviour illegal. In the view of the Metropolitan Court of Budapest Va-
jnai violated the ban on the usage of totalitarian symbols, which is provided for by 
the law in force, which has not been amended 2004. 
As regards the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10(1) ECHR and the 
judgement of 8 July 2008 in the case of Vajnai v Hungary, the Metropolitan Court 
[in:] L. Blutman (ed.), A nemzetközi jog hatása a magyar joggyakorlatra (HVG-ORAC 2014), 
p. 479.
29 See: case Kfv.VI.38.071/2010/4 (Supreme Court, 5 September 2011), not available in English.
30 Act XXXIV on the Police 1998, Art. 92.
31 Budapest Police Headquarters, VI. District Police 146–105/12/1/2009.P. not available, cited 
and referred to in case Kfv.VI.38.071/2010/4 (Supreme Court, 5 September 2011), Act IV on 
Criminal Code 1998 Art. 3, Arts. 7–8, Arts. 16–20 and Art. 21(2); Act CLXI on the organisation 
and administration of courts 2011, Arts. 163–133.
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of Budapest acknowledged that the Hungarian regulation is contrary to the inter-
national standards and the ban on the usage of the red start is not proportional 
to the aim the norm seeks to attain.32 However, the policemen were not obliged 
to verify the personal thoughts and beliefs concerning the meaning and symbol 
of the red star when they performed their duties in line with the provisions of the 
Police Act.33 The  reasonable suspicion of  an offence was the base of  their pro-
cedure. They were obliged to follow the  legislation in  force and  they were not 
entitled to take the inconsistency of the legislation in force with the ECHR into 
account.34
Vajnai appealed against the decision of the Metropolitan Court of Budapest 
and asked for the revision of the judgment before the Supreme Court of Hun-
gary. Vajnai argued that the circumstances made it unambiguous that the usage 
of the red star was meant to imply his party’s leftist leanings. He submitted that 
his behaviour had not endangered in any way the society thus the act he com-
mitted was neither a crime nor an offence. The policemen working on the site 
of  the demonstration or at least for the  IPCB, which supervised their action, 
should have been acquainted with the  reasoning of  the judgment of  Vajnai 
v Hungary. 
The Supreme Court of Hungary upheld the judgment of the court of first 
instance. The  Supreme Court emphasized that the  handing of  flyers with 
a banned totalitarian symbol can be considered as a sufficient reason for the po-
licemen to act. In the view of the Court, the policemen did not have the duty 
to verify whether the behaviour of demonstrators and of Vajnai, in particular, 
created a danger to the society. The examination of the circumstances of the 
alleged crime or offence is  the task of  the future criminal proceedings; thus, 
the policemen should not be impeached for not knowing the Vajnai v Hungary 
judgment. In  short, it is  not their obligation to resolve the  conflict between 
domestic law and  international obligations. The  ECtHR indeed expressed 
its opinion on the  conformity of  Hungarian criminal regulation concerning 
the red star with its standards. Yet, the judgment is addressed to the legislator 
thus it is the duty of the legislator to introduce the necessary amendments to 
the domestic law. 
Subsequently, the  statements of  the judgment were taken into consideration 
during the criminal proceedings, as Vajnai was not condemned.35 He tried to prove 
in vain that the policemen at site had made a mistake and initiated several pro-
ceedings to have the administrative decision annulled and so this way to gain jus-
32 On totalitarian symbol as a  threat to the  society and  the reasoning of  the judgment see: 
A.  Koltay, ‘A  Vajnai-ügy. Az Emberi Jogok Európai Bíróságának ítélete a  vörös csillag 
viselésének büntethetőségéről’ (2010) 1 JeMa 77.
33 Act XXXIV on the Police 1998.
34 Case 27.K.30.848/2010/3 (Budapest Metropolitan Court, 29 June 2010), revised in case Kfv.
VI.38.071/2010/4 (Supreme Court, 5 September 2011). 
35 Case Kfv.VI.38.071/2010/4 (Supreme Court, 5 September 2011). 
X. Who is to Give Effects to the ECtHR Decisions? 491
tice. Vajnai never succeeded. The administrative organs neither in first, nor in the 
second instance accepted to apply the findings of the ECtHR in relation to domes-
tic criminal law provisions.36
4.2. The Police and the ECtHR judgment
In the Hungarian legal system, the law enforcement authorities such as the po-
lice belong to the executive power, and their structure is a part of the administration 
of the State.37 Decisions elaborated by administrative organs are subject to an inter-
nal remedy within the administrative system provided by the body supervisory to 
the organ elaborating decision. In addition, the judicial remedy is also guaranteed 
by the  FL, which states that “everyone shall have the  right to seek legal remedy 
against any court, authority or other administrative decision which violates his or 
her rights or legitimate interests.”38 The revision of administrative decisions is a task 
of twenty administrative and labour courts placed in each of Hungary’s counties.
The administrative proceedings instigated by Vajnai would have been unnec-
essary if the administrative authorities (the police) would have been more flexible 
and move away from their duties expressed in the Police Act in favour of the relevant 
and obligatory statements of the judgment Vajnai v Hungary. In fact, the judgment 
obliges the State to modify its domestic law, it has no direct effect, but the findings 
incorporated in  judgments should be given a  respectful consideration. They in-
terpret and clarify the Treaty-based obligations and due to this fact, they shall be 
applied when such obligations are to be enforced.39 But how is it done in practice?
4.3. Doctrinal Background: the Non-harmonisation 
of Domestic Law with International Law as a Key Issue
After the 2008 ECtHR judgment of Vajnai v Hungary, the Hungarian Govern-
ment refused the modification of the Criminal Code to deregulate the total ban 
on the usage of the red star. It declared that, in contrast with the reasoning of the 
ECtHR, the vividness of historical memories and experiences still requires this kind 
of a  radical regulation. The Hungarian Government maintained its stance, even 
when on 3 November 2011 the ECtHR passed the second judgment on the same 
36 See: case Kfv.II.38.073/2010/4 (Supreme Court, 22 June 2011), case Kfv.III.38.074/2010/4 
(Supreme Court, 27 June 2011), and  case Kfv.III.38.075/2010/4 (Supreme Court, 8 June 
2011), case Kfv.II.37.798/2013/4 (Curia, 12 February 2014), case Kfv.II.37.814/2013/3 (Cu-
ria, 12 March 2014), case Kfv.II.37.800/2013/3 (26 February 2014), case Kfv.II.37.806/2013/3 
(26 February 2014).
37 Act XLIII on central state organs and the status of the members of the Government and that 
of the state secretaries 2010, Art. 1(5)a).
38 FL (n. 2), Art. XXVIII(7).
39 C. Dominicé, ‘The International Responsibility of  States for Breach of  International Obliga-
tions’ (1999) 10 EJIL 2, p. 353; A.M. Slaughter, W. Burke-White, ‘The Future of International Law 
is Domestic (or, The European Way of Law)’ (2006) 47 Harvard International Law Journal 2 327.
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issue in Fratanoló v Hungary.40 The situation changed with the submission of Va-
jnai to the Constitutional Court to re-examine the ban on the red star in the view 
of the two ECtHR judgments. At the beginning of 2013 the Constitutional Court 
analysed Article 10 ECHR and the judicial practice on the freedom of expression 
in the view of the Strasbourg standards and subsequently reformulated its approach 
to the red star and its possible threat to society agreeing that it is the unreasonable 
restriction to the freedom of expression. Finally, it held that the prohibition of us-
ing the five-point red star is unconstitutional. It argued that the current regulation 
defines criminal conducts too widely as the use of the symbols is punished in gen-
eral; however, the consideration of the purpose, the method or the result of the use 
for each symbol might be indispensable. Therefore, the provision of the Criminal 
Code prohibiting the use of symbols associated with totalitarian regimes was de-
clared to be in violation with the  requirement of  legal certainty and, in Vajnai’s 
case, the freedom of expression.41 The Constitutional Court annulled the alleged 
provision of the Criminal Code (Article 269/B) with the effect as of 30 April 2013.42
4.4. Which Standard to Apply in the Lack of State’s 
Implementation of the ECtHR Judgment?
Almost the same story happened to Fratanoló on 1 May 2004 in Pécs. He wore 
a red star on his jacket at a legitimate labour demonstration. He was condemned 
for the offence of usage of a banned totalitarian symbol.43 He appealed and here 
40 The Hungarian Parliament declared the compliance of the regulation of totalitarian symbols 
with the social needs and refused its modification. See: The Parliament, Report no. J/6853 on 
the issues related to the execution of obligations deriving from the Fratanoló v Hungary judg-
ment of the ECtHR (Parliament, 2 July 2012), <http://www.parlament.hu/irom39/06853/06853.
pdf> (access: 31 July 2013) and Decision 58/2012. On the acceptance of the report on the issues 
related to the execution of obligations deriving from the Fratanoló v Hungary judgment of the 
ECtHR (Parliament 2012): T. Molnár, ‘Két kevéssé ismert nemzetközi jogforrás helye a belső 
jogban: a nemzetközi bíróságok döntései, valamint az egyoldalú állami aktusok esete a Mag-
yar jogrendszerrel’ (2012) 3 Közjogi Szemle 1, 3. K. Bárd, ‘The Legal Order of Hungary and the 
European Convention on Human Rights’, [in:] I. Motoc, I. Ziemele (eds), The Impact of the ECHR 
on Democratic Change in  Central and  Eastern Europe: Judicial Perspectives (CUP 2016) 186; 
P. Bárd, S. Carrera, E. Guild, D. Kochenov, ‘An EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law 
and Fundamental Rights’ (2016) 91 CEPS Papers in Liberty and Security in Europe 81.
41 Case 4/2013 (II. 21.) (Constitutional Court, 21 February 2013) 142, summary is  available 
in English: <http://www.codices.coe.int/NXT/gateway.dll?f=templates&fn=default.htm> (ac-
cess: 14 July 2014).
42 Ibidem, 148. On the motifs of annulment see: J.Z. Tóth, ‘Az önkényuralmi jelképek használa-
ta mint a  véleménynyilvánítási szabadság korlátja? (A  4/2013 (II. 21.) AB határozat előz-
ményei, indokai és következményei, valamint az új Btk.-szabályozás pozitívumai és fogy-
atékosságai)’ (2013) 2 JESZ 1, <http://jesz.ajk.elte.hu/tothj54.pdf> (access: 29 February 
2016) 18.
43 Case 12. B. 1482/2007/10 (Pécs Municipal Court, 2007) not available, it is cited and referred to 
in case 121/2008/5 (Baranya County Court, 23 September 2008).
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came the turning point: the court of second instance acquitted him in the judg-
ment of 23 September 2008 establishing that no crime was committed.44 The court 
of  second instance examined the  possible danger of  the symbol to the  society 
and came to the same conclusion as the ECtHR in Vajnai v Hungary. Moreover, 
it referred to Article 3(b) of Protocol 9 to the ECHR according to which Hungary 
is obliged to acknowledge and accept the competence of the ECtHR to interpret 
ECHR and its protocols. The Court also declared expressis verbis the lack of danger 
to the society, so the wearing of the red star was neither a crime nor an offence. 
It also confirmed this reasoning in the Vajnai v Hungary case and put an emphasis 
on the fact that the international standard of interpretation is contrary to that of the 
Constitutional Court’s one expressed in its decision of 2000.45 The court of second 
instance applied international law in contrast to domestic legal provisions of the 
Criminal Code. In order to be able to issue a judgment which satisfies the inter-
national legal requirements of  a democratic State that respects human rights at 
the level of the ECtHR, the court of second instance had to put aside domestic law 
to give effect to international legal provisions. This kind of legal practice is in har-
mony with the FL. International law is superior to domestic law and only by fol-
lowing this rule the effect of international obligations can be ensured. At the same 
time, the Court sustained that the harmonization of international legal obligations 
and domestic legal norms is primarily the task of the legislator. If the duty is not 
fulfilled, then the Constitutional Court is obliged to take action to restore the or-
der in the legal system. In fact, before an international obligation is transformed 
into the domestic legal system and the process of ratification is concluded, the leg-
islator should lay ground for the adjustment of the normative environment and in-
troduce the necessary modifications of domestic law. 
In fact, in Hungary the ‘transformation’ is the procedure of proclaiming inter-
national norms in the form of an act or decree. Nevertheless, if grain of sand slips 
into the machine or the legislator does not act in conformity with the international 
obligations by adopting necessary changes in  legal norms, those entities, which 
apply law are confused as to which norms to apply. Those who do it law might face 
the problem of having two different norms applicable to the same situation: one, 
which expresses international obligations and another which is domestic in ori-
gins. Law enforcement authorities are not entitled to derogate norms in the name 
of the principle of priority of  international law; that is  the task of  the Constitu-
tional Court. Can they ignore and put aside the domestic originated norms in the 
favour of international ones? They should. Are all the forms of international law 
in the Hungarian legal system behaving the same in such situations? What about 
those norms, which are not transformed into the legal system such as ECtHR judg-
ments but are significant sources for the ECHR interpretation? And what about 
44 Case 121/2008/5 (Baranya County Court, 23 September 2008).
45 Ibidem.
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the judgment especially delivered in Hungary’s case condemning a Hungarian le-
gal norm, which is to be applied in a given case?46
Such questions were posed during the procedure of the Pécs Court of Appeals, 
which in 2010 altered the judgment of the second instance and held that Fratanoló 
was guilty of usage of a totalitarian symbol. Due to this inconsistency of judicial 
practice, Fratanoló opened a procedure before the ECtHR, therefore, the ruling 
of the Vajnai v Hungary was reinforced by the ECtHR in its judgment of 3 No-
vember 2011.47 The Hungarian Government was called upon again to derogate its 
legislation on the total ban on the usage of the red star.48
The Supreme Court, or as it is called since 2011, the Curia, pursued a super-
vision procedure in  the view of  the ECtHR judgement in  Fratanoló v Hungary, 
and  acquitted Fratanoló declaring the  lack of  crime or offence. It  declared that 
wearing of the red star in the way Fratanoló did was neither a crime belonging to 
the sphere of criminal law, nor an offence meaning an act, which is less harmful for 
the society and thus belongs to the administrative power represented by the police. 
It held that Fratanoló expressed his political opinion while wearing the red star at 
a lawful demonstration of the labour party thus this act is protected by the free-
dom of  expression guaranteed by Article 10(1) ECHR. His behaviour was not 
a threat to the society as it could not be associated with any motivation to restore 
the communist dictatorship. Moreover, the Curia drew the attention to the  fact 
that the Hungarian State was not entitled to maintain such restriction to the free-
dom of expression.49
4.5. Which Organ is Obliged to Take International 
Obligations into Consideration?
On 29 July 2012, the Vajnai situation has repeated: the police action was con-
ducted against a person wearing the red star and handling flyers with the red star 
at a lawful demonstration had to go through the same police action. This person 
submitted a complaint to the Independent Police Complaints Board (ICPB). In its 
decision the ICPB changed the reasoning, expanded its competences and stated 
that the provision of the criminal Code concerning the red star violates the Fun-
damental Law as well as the ECHR but the legal qualification of this fact is beyond 
the scope of the police action.50 The National Police Headquarters, the supervisory 
body to the ICPD, refused the complaint arguing that it is not the task of the police 
to verify the circumstances, their duty is  to act in  the case of a reasoned suspi-
46 J. Laffranque, ‘Who Has the Last Word on the Protection of Human Rights in Europe?’ (2012) 
Juridica International XIX 119. Cf. Dudás D.V., ‘Az Emberi Jogok Európai Bírósága és a hazai 
közigazgatási bíróságok közötti kölcsönhatás’ (2014) Fundamentum 1–2 106.
47 Fratanoló v Hungary, App. no. 29459/10 (ECHR, 3 November 2011), para. 26.
48 Ibidem, paras 20–28.
49 Case Bfv.III.570/2012/2 (Curia, 10 July 2012). 
50 Case 70/2013 (III. 13.) (Independent Police Complaints Board, 9 September 2014).
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cion of a crime and that was the case when they realized the usage of a banned 
totalitarian symbol.51
However, this time, the judicial review of the administrative decision annulled 
the decision and ordered the administrative authority to open a new procedure.52 
The Court declared that the policemen in charge should have known that the act, 
namely the usage of the red star is not always a crime or offence.
What was different in  this case? First, the  Pécs Municipal Administrative 
and Labour Court declared that all the state organs, including the police, all oth-
er entities who apply law, are obliged to do it in conformity with the FL and the 
ECHR. The application of  law in  the view of  international obligations can only 
reach the aim of elaborating decisions, which are in conformity with international 
obligations of Hungary, if the one who enforces law does it in a way, which ensures 
the respect for such norms. The main dispute between the parties in the Vajnai 
case, in the Court’s point of view, whether the relevant provision of the Police Act 
can be the object of  interpretation or not, because if it can be interpreted, then 
the international norms can prevail. The Court held that the provisions of the Po-
lice Act can be subject to interpretation.
The police decision stated that the acts of the police were grounded on the fact 
that they are obliged to intervene if someone is caught during the commitment 
of an intentional crime. In the discussed case, the organizer of a labour demonstra-
tion primarily notified the possibility of the use of banned symbols due to the na-
ture of  the movement and he assumed the criminal consequences. In  this case, 
the police was aware of the potential use of the red star and the nature of the event, 
thus the inoffensive use of the banned symbol. This way, the checking of identi-
ty, screening of  clothes and  arresting people was absolutely disproportionate to 
the acts of the demonstrators. The police acts might have been lawful but under 
the above-mentioned circumstances they were not proportional. All these acts have 
as their objective the  identification of  perpetrators and  ensuring their presence 
during the criminal procedure, but in this case, it was not necessary. The Court 
cited the Vajnai v Hungary and Fratanoló v Hungary judgments to highlight that 
the legal instruments to limit the freedom of expression should be well grounded 
and proportional to the aim of preventing harm to the society. It even referred to 
the recent decision of the Constitutional Court that finally abolished the provision 
of the Criminal Code in question, which entered into force on 30 April 2013.53
In the  other similar case, the  applicant wearing a  red star badge participat-
ed in a demonstration on 1 May 2012. He was arrested by the police and held at 
51 Case 29000-105/376-1/2013.RP (National Police Headquarters, 2013) not available, cited 
and referred to in case 17.K.31.995/2013/2 (Budapest Metropolitan Administration and La-
bour Court, 9 October 2013).
52 Case 17.K.31.995/2013/2 (Budapest Metropolitan Administration and Labour Court, 9 Octo-
ber 2013).
53 Case 17.K.31.995/2013/2 (Budapest Metropolitan Administration and Labour Court, 9 Octo-
ber 2013).
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the police station for hours. No criminal procedure was opened because of the lack 
of crime, but the applicant submitted a complaint to the ICPB because of the hard-
ship he experienced. The complaint was refused, as well as his appeal to the Na-
tional Police Headquarters.54 Therefore, he appealed for a judicial remedy follow-
ing the administrative decision of the police.
The court of first instance referred to the fact that the annulment decision of the 
Constitutional Court which deregulates the ban on red star entered into force only 
on 30 April 2013, thus the authorities acted in conformity with the law in force 
at the  time of  the demonstration. The Court emphasized that the policeman at 
site was not in  that position to examine the  intentions of  wearing the  red star. 
Furthermore, the fact that no criminal procedure was opened against the plain-
tiff is not a ground for the revision of the police action taken against him at site 
and at the police station. It was the normal way of administrating his behaviour 
as he wore a banned totalitarian symbol. The Court evoked the ECtHR case law 
and emphasized that it is addressed to the legislator. The policeman is not a leg-
islator therefore he was not entitled to resolve the conflict between international 
obligations and domestic legal provisions.55
The applicant appealed against this judgment. He argued that the police act 
was unlawful as the policemen at site did not examine the intentions of wearing 
the red star. In his point of view, it is not enough to prove that a behaviour formally 
violates the criminal law, the reasoned suspicion is not enough to arrest a person 
and keep him at the police station for an undetermined period especially when 
both of the ECtHR judgments against Hungary on the use of the red star and its 
relationship to the freedom of expression were well known at that time. Therefore, 
the policemen at site, or at least, the  supreme administrative authority, the Na-
tional Police Headquarter should have known that the applicant’s behaviour is not 
in every case a danger to the society. The action of the police is unlawful not only 
because of this fact. If a criminal is captured, placing him in detention is to ensure 
that he does not abscond from participation in a criminal procedure. In the pres-
ent case, the applicant did not want to impede the police procedure thus it was not 
necessary to hold him in custody.
The subsequent decision of the Curia reinforced the findings that had already 
been articulated in former decisions: it is not the duty of the policemen at site to 
verify neither the regulations of international conventions nor the Criminal Code; 
their duty was to arrest the one who is caught in the act of an intentional crime. 
Therefore, the police and its officers did not violate any legal provisions, including 
the ECtHR case law; they just respected and obeyed the rules, which referred to 
54 Case 29000/105/547-56/2012.P (National Police Headquarters, 2012) not available, cited 
and referred to in case 17.K.31.995/2013/2 (Budapest Metropolitan Administration and La-
bour Court, 9 October 2013).
55 Case 20.K.31.328/2013/3 (Budapest Metropolitan Administration and Labour Court, 9 Octo-
ber 2013).
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their activity.56 They do  it so faithfully, that Vajnai and  his companion suffered 
the same whole procedure, which ended up before the ECtHR again where Hun-
gary was condemned for the same.57
5. Problems Revealed by the Vajnai Saga
The domestic application of international law is challenging. The transforma-
tion of international legal provisions into domestic ones is regulated by constitu-
tional provisions. In this vein, the Constitutional Court held that interna tional law 
is  not to be adjusted to the  conditions of  domestic law, but rather domestic 
law should be adjusted to comply with international law.58
However, conflicts of norms can always emerge in practice and it is even more 
problematic when the entity applying a given provision is not aware of the fact that 
the area in question is highly affected by international legal sources, which shall 
overwrite domestic ones in case of conflict. It derives from the primacy of inter-
national law, although in  legal practice the  international judicial interpretation 
of  treaty based obligations cause problems. The  application of  a  self-executing 
treaty causes fewer problems but as the direct effect of ECtHR judgments is not 
expressis verbis acknowledged, the effect of their content is challenged.
Since the entry into force of the modification of the law on the procedure re-
lating to international treaties, the following provision is in force from 1 January 
2012: the decisions of the organ having jurisdiction over the disputes in relation to 
a treaty or convention shall be obligatory in the course of interpreting it.59 The Con-
stitutional Court’s decision 18/2004 (V. 25.) states that the  jurisprudence of  the 
ECtHR shapes and carries obligations for the Hungarian legal practice. This kind 
of obligation refers to the interpretation of the different provisions of the Conven-
tion, the findings of a judgment and not to the ruling of it.60 However, there seems 
to be a little contradiction when the Constitutional Court stated almost ten years 
later, in 2013, that the judgment of the ECtHR is declarative, it does not change 
legal concepts. At the same time, it declares that these judgments help the inter-
pretation and exploration of the content of fundamental rights. The content of the 
conventional rights is, in fact, embodied in the case law of the ECtHR, therefore 
they contribute to the uniform interpretation and application of the Convention 
56 Case Kfv.II.37.807/2013/4 (Curia, 12 February 2014).
57 See: Horváth and Vajnai v Hungary, App. nos 55795/11 and 55798/11 (ECtHR, 23 September 
2014).
58 Case 53/1993 (X. 13.) (Constitutional Court, 13 October 1993), p. 323.
59 Act L on the procedure related to international agreements 2005, Art. 13(1). 
60 L. Blutman (n. 27), pp. 304, 310.
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itself. The  Strasbourg practice defines the  minimum level of  fundamental right 
protection, but it does not impede domestic law from applying at a higher level.61 
In the same decision, the Constitutional Court states that the Hungarian courts 
shall apply the domestic law in  force even if the case before them is practically 
the same that has already been resolved by the ECtHR.62 The  judgement of  the 
ECtHR condemning Hungarian legal provisions and  demanding modifications 
can only be taken into account by the Curia while it opens an extraordinary su-
pervisory procedure to modify a previous judgement whose object was submitted 
to the ECtHR. The problem emerges when the domestic judicial remedies system 
is exhausted and then the applicants turn to the ECtHR, which decides in favour 
of an applicant against Hungary. In such cases an applicant has the right to submit 
a claim to the Curia to open a supervisory procedure and to reinterpret the case 
in the view of the ECtHR judgment.63 Invoking international obligations by judi-
cial organs is significant not only because it helps to enforce them and interpret 
domestic legal norms in a way that they should correspond to the assumed inter-
national obligations but on the other hand, in a more conceptual way, such kind 
of behaviour of national courts contributes to the practice of States as an evidence 
to the existence of customary international law.64
The Hungarian law enforcement authorities are not to put aside domestic reg-
ulations in order to give effect to contrary international legal norms. The party to 
the dispute must follow the system of judicial remedies up to the Curia to which 
is the organ that is entitled to order to repeat the judicial procedure at first instance 
in the view of the insights of the ECtHR, as it happened to the case of Fratanoló.65 
According to the procedural law in force, formally this is the way of gaining jus-
tice if the ECHR guarantees a better protection of one’s fundamental rights than 
the State regulations, whenever domestic law is not in conformity with the ECHR.
Even if remedies are  available in  specific and  individual cases of  Hungarian 
citizens decided at the ECtHR levels, analogous cases not taken to the Strasbourg 
court remain problematic. In these cases, it is up to the discretion of the judges 
whether they intend to pick the ECtHR standards over a contrary domestic regu-
lation or not.
As the  presented cases show, the  administrative authorities and  the police, 
do not even consider the fact that fundamental right issues might have not only 
domestic but international law sources that might help to explore and  apply 
the law. However, as it is seen from the practice and the Constitutional Court state-
ments, courts are not required at all to take into consideration ECtHR judgements 
even if it is clearly contrary to domestic law. The ECtHR judgments cannot have 
61 Case 4/2013 (II. 21.) (Constitutional Court, 21 February 2013), para. 133.
62 Ibidem, para. 147.
63 Act XIX on criminal proceedings 1998, Art. 416(g).
64 A. Roberts, ‘Comparative International Law? The Role of National Courts in Creating and En-
forcing International Law’ (2011])60 ICLQ 57.
65 Case Bfv.III.570/2012/2 (Curia, 10 July 2012). 
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direct effect and the long and costly way of gaining justice needs to be treaded even 
in those cases when the  legal procedure was obviously superfluous and it could 
have been settled at the police level in the competence of administrative organs, 
instead of stepping to the ground of the judicial remedies. 
Considering the present case of a totalitarian symbol, the new Criminal Code 
that entered into force on 1 July 2013 limited the ban on the use of totalitarian sym-
bols and restricted its regulation. Now, only that activity can be qualified as crime, 
which is capable of disturbing public peace in a way that can hurt human dignity 
or memory of those who were victims of the regime represented by the symbol 
in question.66 However, the  list of banned symbols stayed the  same and  the ar-
gumentation concerning the effect of  the totalitarian symbol on victims “seems 
to have been an additional, rather than the core, reason in the argumentation”67 
of  the ECtHR judgment of  Vajnai. Several ECtHR judgments since then stand 
as evidence that some Hungarian criminal courts refuse to alter their practice to 
bring it in line with the ECtHR case law.68 It seems that in Hungary the complete 
transition to democracy is yet to come along with the proper enforcement of in-
ternational obligation.
66 Act C of 2012 on Criminal Code, Art. 335.
67 A. Buyse, M. Hamilton, Transitional Jurisprudence and the ECHR: Justice, Politics and Rights 
(CUP 2011), p. 137.
68 R. Uitz, ‘The Illusion of  a  Constitution in  Europe: The  Hungarian Constitution Court after 
the  Fifth Amendment of  the fundamental Law’, [in:] J. Bell, M.-L. Paris (eds), Rights-Based 
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